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Abstract
Decades of  systemic failure to take environmental protection seriously has brought Northern Ireland to the
brink of  environmental, and now political and economic disaster. This article will consider the reasons why
environmental governance in this jurisdiction has continued to be so problematic and the cost of  government
failure in this context for the people of  Northern Ireland. It will set out the environmental, economic and
socio-political consequences of  the epic failures of  successive devolved administrations to take environmental
governance seriously, to respond to critiques of  the performance of  the environmental regulator and to ensure
the effective enforcement of  environmental law. Finally, it will consider options for dealing with this ongoing
problem in a turbulent political environment where collapsing political institutions at Stormont and wider
constitutional issues associated with the UK’s plans to leave the EU may continue to stymie reform or present
a unique opportunity to reinvent environmental governance and begin the process of  remedying the damage
caused by years of  neglect.
Keywords: Environmental governance; Northern Ireland; enforcement; regulation; 
waste crime.
1 Introduction
Recent scandals including the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) debacle1 and thediscovery of  illegal dumping on a massive scale2 have catapulted Northern Ireland’s
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1     The RHI scandal and its implications will be discussed below, but essentially involved the mismanagement and
alleged corruption of  a funding scheme designed to incentivise the installation of  renewable heat technologies
(particularly wood-pellet stoves). A failure to apply proper cost controls has resulted in a predicted overspend
of  hundreds of  millions of  pounds. The scheme was delivered by the (then) Department of  Enterprise, Trade
and Investment from 2012 until its suspension in 2016 and the departmental minister who oversaw its
implementation was Arlene Foster – First Minister when the scandal broke in late 2016. For an overview of
the RHI scheme and key dates in the timeline see ‘Q&A: What is the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI)
Scheme’ BBC News (13 December 2016) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38307628> and
Thomas Muinzer, ‘Incendiary Developments: Northern Ireland’s Renewable Heat Incentive and the Collapse
of  the Devolved Government’ (March/April 2017) 99 UKELA E-Law 18.
2     Ciara Brennan, ‘The Enforcement of  Waste Regulation in Northern Ireland: Deterrence, Dumping and the
Dynamics of  Devolution’ (2016) 28(3) Journal of  Environmental Law 471–96. Discoveries of  more illegal
dumps continue to be made, and in early 2017 the Irish News reported that the NIEA was currently 
environmental governance failures into the public eye. The financial implications of  these
failures – which extend far beyond recent news headlines – are so epic in scale that they
have played a key role in the destabilisation of  Stormont’s political institutions and now
threaten the economic viability of  the state.3 To many the impending crisis is no surprise
and the problematic nature of  environmental governance in Northern Ireland has been well
documented over the last 30 years. Official scrutiny bodies such as the House of  Commons
Environment Select Committee,4 Northern Ireland Audit Office (NIAO),5 the Northern
Ireland Affairs Committee (NIAC),6 the Public Accounts Committee (PAC)7 and the
Criminal Justice Inspectorate (CJI)8 have all published reports that have highlighted serious
deficiencies both in how arrangements for environmental governance have been designed
and how environmental regulation has been delivered. There have also been high-level
governance reviews (commissioned by both the environmental non-governmental
organisation (ENGO) community and government) which have set out clear and achievable
options for reform.9 For over a decade Northern Ireland’s ENGO community has
campaigned without success for an independent environmental regulator to enhance the
protection of  the jurisdiction’s natural resources.10 Academic analysis has highlighted
significant issues with Northern Irish environmental law and its implementation.11 Even the
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(n 2 continued) investigating over 700 illegal dumping incidents involving an estimated 500,000 tonnes of  waste.
See, John Monaghan, ‘More than 700 Live Investigations into Illegal Dumping in Northern Ireland’ Irish News
(Belfast, 4 January 2017) <www.irishnews.com/news/2017/01/04/news/more-than-700-live-investigations-
into-illegal-dumping-in-northern-ireland-862958/>.
3     The extent to which the RHI scandal caused the collapse of  the devolved government is disputed. Sinn Féin’s
narrative characterises RHI (specifically Arlene Foster’s refusal to step aside as First Minister while the issues
with RHI were investigated) as the ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’, but DUP policy decisions relating to
Brexit, legacy issues, cutting of  Irish Language funding, the delay in introducing an Irish Language Act, the
failing health of  Sinn Féin party leader Martin McGuinness and worsening DUP/Sinn Féin relations
throughout 2016 were also clearly significant factors. The DUP disputes any wrongdoing on the part of
Arlene Foster and, at the time of  writing, the matter is due to be investigated via public inquiry. See Chris
Page, ‘Stormont: All You Need to Know about NI’s Latest Political Crisis’ BBC News (16 January 2017)
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38612860>.
4     House of  Commons Select Committee on the Environment, Environmental Issues in Northern Ireland (First Report
of  the Environment Committee (Rossi Report) HC 1990–91, 39). 
5     NIAO, Control of  River Pollution in Northern Ireland (HC 1997–98, 693); NIAO, Areas of  Special Scientific Interest
(HC 2003–2004, 499); NIAO, Northern Ireland’s Waste Management Strategy (HC 2005–06, 88).
6     House of  Commons NIAC, Waste Management Strategy in Northern Ireland (HC 2004–05, 349-I).
7     Northern Ireland Assembly PAC, Control of  River Pollution in Northern Ireland (Third Report 2001)
<http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/public/reports/report3-00r.htm>. 
8     CJI, Enforcement in the Department of  the Environment (2007) <www.cjini.org/getattachment/6e35e56d-68e5-
41d3-b099-c33586abf0dd/Enforcement-in-the-Department-of-Environment.aspx>; CJI, Enforcement in the
Department of  the Environment Northern Ireland: A Follow Up Review of  Inspection Recommendations (2011)
<www.cjini.org/CJNI/files/d7/d71473bc-2dc9-4ff5-b957-d410ff851852.pdf> 9; CJI, A Review of  the Northern
Ireland Environment Agency’s Environmental Crime Unit (2015) < www.cjini.org/getattachment/776ee5fc-b3c0-
4759-8fbe-18a72a8f31e5/A-review-of-the-Northern-Ireland-Environment-Agenc.aspx> 35.
9     Richard Macrory, Transparency and Trust: Reshaping Environmental Governance in Northern Ireland (UCL Press 2004)
and Tom Burke, Gordon Bell and Sharon Turner, Foundations for the Future: The Review of  Environmental
Governance (2007) <www.ukela.org/content/doclib/135.pdf>.
10   For a detailed discussion of  this campaign, see Sharon Turner and Ciara Brennan, ‘Modernising
Environmental Regulation in Northern Ireland: A Case Study in Devolved Decision Making’ (2012) 63
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 509.
11   Ibid and e.g. Sharon Turner, ‘Transforming Environmental Governance in Northern Ireland: Part One: The
Process of  Policy Renewal’ (2006a) 18 Journal of  Environmental Law 55; Sharon Turner, ‘Transforming
Environmental Governance in Northern Ireland Part Two: The Case of  Environmental Regulation’ (2006b)
18 Journal of  Environmental Law 245; Sharon Turner, ‘The Review of  Environmental Governance in
Northern Ireland’ (2009) 2 Environmental Law Review 10–16; Brennan (n 2).
environmental regulator has commissioned reports which have identified significant
problems with its own performance.12 Perhaps the most damning indictments of  the
current governance systems have come from within government itself. One former
Environment Minister, Alex Attwood, described the structures of  the Northern Ireland
Environment Agency (NIEA) in 2013 as not being fit for purpose.13 Another recent
(former) Environment Minister, Mark H Durkan, said in 2015 that the present
environmental governance models were in need of  radical review and needed to be replaced
quickly.14 However, despite evidence of  serious regulatory dysfunction stretching back over
three decades, unacceptable levels of  non-compliance with environmental law and
significant degradation of  environmental quality, Northern Ireland’s political class, as a
whole, ultimately seems unwilling or unable to actually instigate any real change.
To some degree, the relegation of  environmental concerns down the list of  political
imperatives in societies emerging from conflict is not surprising and has been recognised
in other jurisdictions.15 However, 20 years after the Good Friday Agreement and in the
face of  a long history of  warnings, criticism and debates on this issue in the intervening
years, failure to engage with the need for effective environmental governance and respond
with meaningful reform now seems difficult to justify.16 With the fall-out from the RHI
scandal still looming over Northern Ireland’s increasingly fragile political institutions and
as the financial legacy of  the years of  regulatory neglect of  the environment begins to
become clear, Northern Ireland’s taxpayers will ultimately now have to pay the price for
the government’s failure to protect their environment. However, amidst ongoing
negotiations about Northern Ireland’s political future, the issue of  environmental
governance could now be ‘back on the table’. Faced with dramatic political and economic
uncertainty in the wake of  the Brexit vote and Stormont’s collapse, a unique moment in
time may have been created where there are opportunities to reform environmental
governance structures, remould political attitudes to the environment and set in place a
plan for full-scale renovation of  Northern Ireland’s approach to environmental
protection. On the other hand, continued sidelining of  these issues will have serious
implications for decades to come.
This article will unravel the complexities of  the environmental governance debate in
Northern Ireland. It will firstly consider characteristics of  ‘good’ environmental
governance and set out an analytical framework that can be used to assess this quality and
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12   Christopher Mills, A Review of  Waste Disposal at the Mobuoy Site and the Lessons Learnt for the Future Regulation of
the Waste Industry in Northern Ireland (Mills Report, DOE 2013).
13   Northern Ireland Assembly, Private Members Business, 21 January 2013
<http://www.theyworkforyou.com/ni/?id=2013–01–21.7.1>.
14   Northern Ireland Executive, ‘Durkan Opens Debate for an Independent Environment Protection Agency’
(Press Release, 22 September 2015) <https://ciwm-journal.co.uk/ni-proposes-independent-environment-
protection-agency/>.
15   E.g. Ken Conca and Jennifer Wallace, ‘Environment and Peacebuilding in War-torn Societies: Lessons from
the UN Environment Programme’s Experience with Post-Conflict Assessment’ (2009) 15(4) Global
Governance: A Review of  Multilateralism and International Organizations 485–504. For discussion of  the
impact of  the conflict on environmental governance in Northern Ireland, see Sharon Turner and Karen
Morrow, Northern Ireland Environmental Law (Gill & Macmillan 1997); Karen Morrow and Sharon Turner, ‘The
More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same? Environmental Law, Policy and Funding in Northern
Ireland’ (1998) 10(1) Journal of  Environmental Law 41–59.
16   One of  the UK’s foremost environmentalists argued in 2015 that Northern Ireland should no longer use its
troubled past as an excuse for failings over the environment. Jonathon Porritt said on the BBC that ‘while
there had been a justifiable focus on the political process, things needed to change. There’s no excuse any
longer for relegating the environment to a second-division issue.’ ‘Jonathon Porritt: Troubles “No Excuse for
Environmental Failings”’ BBC News (7 June 2015) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-33025054>.
facilitate an evaluation of  the degree of  divergence from this model in Northern Ireland.
The article will then identify the core problems with the current environmental
governance arrangements, drawing from documented evidence of  regulatory and policy
dysfunction stretching back over 30 years which reflects an unequivocal political failure
to take the protection of  the environment seriously in this jurisdiction. Three key themes
which have featured most prominently in the governance debate in this jurisdiction will
be considered: problematic environmental regulation structures; outdated or ineffective
environmental law and policy; and unsatisfactory delivery of  environmental regulation in
practice. The analysis will then move on to examine the environmental impact, economic
risks and consequences and political and social implications of  weak environmental
governance. The impact of  political developments and, in particular, some of  the
potential threats and opportunities attached to the unfolding Brexit situation will then be
explored. Finally, mechanisms through which environmental protection efforts in
Northern Ireland can be improved, but also insulated from the political maelstrom in
which the jurisdiction is currently engulfed, will be proposed. The article will conclude by
mapping a pathway through which an ambitious programme of  environmental
governance reform in Northern Ireland could be achieved.
2 Evaluating environmental governance ‘success’
Environmental governance is a concept that has inspired a continuously evolving
interdisciplinary field of  theoretical debate, as well as extensive empirical research
examining the regulatory processes, mechanisms and organisations that influence
environmental management and outcomes at global, regional and domestic levels.17 The
distinction between government and governance, the shift to ‘new’ policy instruments
and the need for collaboration between private, public and non-governmental
stakeholders to achieve environmental outcomes have been prominent themes in recent
environmental governance discourse.18 However, what constitutes environmental
governance ‘success’ in a more general sense has proven more difficult to pin down. The
absence of  consensus on a definition of  environmental governance coupled with its
complex, multi-dimensional nature have exacerbated difficulties in establishing an
accepted evaluative framework.19 While key features of  what is considered ‘good’
environmental governance generally include (in various forms) ‘effective collaboration,
participation, deliberation, learning and new, more horizontal, forms of  accountability’, it
is also widely acknowledged that these criteria are, in themselves, difficult to appraise.20
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17   Maria Carmen Lemos and Arun Agrawal, ‘Environmental Governance’ (2006) 31 Annual Review of
Environmental Resources 297–325, 298. 
18   Cameron Holley, Neil Gunningham and Clifford Shearing, The New Environmental Governance (Routledge 2013);
Andrew Jordan, Rüdiger K W Wurzel and Anthony R Zito, ‘New Instruments of  Environmental Governance:
Patterns and Pathways of  Change’ (2003) 12(1) Environmental Politics 1–24; Philipp Pattberg and Fariborz
Zelli (eds), Environmental Politics and Governance in the Anthropocene: Institutions and Legitimacy in a Complex World
(Routledge 2016); Marleen Buizer, Bas Arts and Kasper Kok, ‘Governance, Scale and the Environment: The
Importance of  Recognizing Knowledge Claims in Transdisciplinary Arenas’ (2011) 16(1) Ecology and Society
21; Magali A Delmas and Oran R Young, Governance for the Environment: New Perspectives (Cambridge University
Press 2009).
19   John Vogler and Andrew Jordan. ‘Governance and the Environment’ in Frans Berkhout, Negotiating
Environmental Change: New Perspectives from Social Science (Edward Elgar 2003) 137–58. 
20   Holley et al (n 18) 12.
Although there are inherent difficulties in developing a framework that can evaluate
the success of  a concept as expansive as environmental governance, the integration of
environmental concerns across policy areas is widely perceived as central to achieving
effective environmental governance and sustainable development and is, in some respects,
more straightforward to assess.21 Environmental policy integration (EPI) can thus be
considered as one of  ‘the guiding axioms of  green thinking and practice’ and the extent
to which EPI has occurred can provide insights into wider environmental governance
considerations.22 On one level, the concept is an important policy-making principle, but
it has been argued that the enhanced legal grounding bestowed upon EPI in some
contexts (e.g. within the EU) has elevated its status to a quasi-constitutional ‘standard to
be observed’.23 As a result, academics and policy-makers have sought to develop
systematic analytical frameworks that can shed light on the extent to which EPI has
occurred in a given context.24 One of  the most comprehensive of  these has been created
by the European Environment Agency (EEA). The features identified within the EEA
framework include political commitment and strategic vision; administrative culture and
practices enabling environmental co-operation, coordination and transparency;
environmental integration into policies and programmes; availability of  environmental
information; mechanisms for engagement in consultation and participation; effective use
of  policy instruments; monitoring and learning from experience; mechanisms for
environmental policy evaluation; state of  the environment reporting; and appropriate and
coherent use of  environmental indicators and feed-back mechanisms.25 By considering
how these features operate in a specific context, insights into the overall level of  EPI can
thus demonstrate strengths and weaknesses in systems of  environmental governance.
In Northern Ireland scrutiny reports published over the last three decades have
highlighted significant problems with how the environment is managed and protected.26
There have also been reviews that have explicitly sought to demonstrate environmental
governance failures and which have highlighted directions for reform.27 These scrutiny
reports and reviews have been analysed in detail elsewhere.28 This article will focus on
three dominant themes that have characterised critiques of  environmental governance in
this jurisdiction: problematic environmental regulatory structures; outdated or ineffective
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21   Hens Runhaar, Peter Driessen and Caroline Uittenbroek, ‘Towards a Systematic Framework for the Analysis
of  Environmental Policy Integration’ (2014) 24(4) Environmental Policy and Governance 233–46; Gerard
Mullally and Niall P Dunphy, State of  Play Review of  Environmental Policy Integration Literature (Research Series
Paper 7, National Economic and Social Development Office 2015) <http://files.nesc.ie/
nesc_research_series/Research_Series_Paper_7_UCC.pdf>.
22   Andrew Jordan and Andrea Lenschow, ‘Environmental Policy Integration: A State of  the Art Review’ (2010)
20(3) Environmental Policy and Governance 147–58, 156.
23   Ibid 148. Under Article 6 of  the European Community Treaty, ‘environmental protection requirements must
be integrated into the definition and implementation of  the Community policies and activities . . . in particular
with a view to promoting sustainable development’.
24   William Lafferty and Eivind Hovden, ‘Environmental Policy Integration: Towards an Analytical Framework’
(2003) 12(3) Environmental Politics 1–22; Måns Nilsson and Åsa Persson, ‘Framework for Analysing
Environmental Policy Integration’ (2003) 5(4) Journal of  Environmental Policy and Planning 333–59.
25   EEA, Environmental Policy Integration in Europe: State of  Play and an Evaluative Framework (Technical Report
2/2005, EEA 2005) <www.ieep.eu/work-areas/environmental-governance/environmental-policy-
integration/> 50–5.
26   NIAO (n 5); NIAC (n 6); PAC (n 7); CJI 2007, CJI 2011 and CJI 2015 (n 8).
27   Macrory (n 9) and Burke et al (n 9).
28   Ciara Brennan, The Enforcement of  Environmental Regulation in Northern Ireland: A Story of  Politics, Penalties and
Paradigm Shifts? (PhD thesis, Queen’s University Belfast 2013); Turner 2006a, 2006b and 2009 (n 11); Turner
and Brennan (n 10); Brennan (n 2).
environmental law and policy; and unsatisfactory delivery of  environmental regulation in
practice. These themes are not mutually exclusive, nor are they the only problems to have
been identified. However, they do represent the most recurrent ‘headline’ issues raised in
the Northern Irish context and also broadly mirror the key policy levels considered within
other recent environmental governance research.29 Examining these issues through the
lens of  the EEA’s EPI framework at a time of  significant political turmoil will assist in
clarifying features of  Northern Ireland’s existing environmental governance
arrangements that are in particular need of  reform and highlight pathways towards
delivering these reforms in practice.
3 A history of environmental governance dysfunction
3.1 POLITICAL MANOEUVRING, POWER-SHARING AND STRUCTURES OF ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE
The structural arrangements for the delivery of  environmental regulation in Northern
Ireland remain enigmatic within the UK and Ireland and are perceived with deep
dissatisfaction by ENGOs, academics, almost all of  Northern Ireland’s political parties
and public scrutiny bodies.30 The most obvious difference (and one around which
environmental governance debates have coalesced) is the lack of  an ‘independent’
environmental protection agency (IEPA), where environmental regulation is delivered by
a body at arms-length from central government.31 The rationale for this separation
(which exists in all other parts of  the UK and Ireland) is essentially to prevent political
interference in regulatory decision-making, but also to create a body that can act as a
champion for environmental interests and whose decision-making is guided by the need
to protect the environment rather than any other factors.32 However, uniquely within the
UK, the NIEA carries out the bulk of  regulatory activities relating to the environment as
an executive agency within a central government department.33 Although the presence of
an IEPA is not necessarily a prerequisite for effective environmental protection, many of
the regulatory failures that have occurred over the past 30 years have been attributed to
this feature of  Northern Ireland’s environmental governance arrangements.34 Particularly
problematic issues have been the creation of  ‘poacher–gamekeeper’ scenarios within
environmental regulation,35 allegations of  political interference in regulatory decision-
making36 and inconsistent environmental policy-making dependant on the political
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29   Wurzel, Zito and Jordan, for example, adopt an institutionalist approach which examines organisational
structures, policy style and policy goals/strategies in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK and how
these factors have influenced and are influenced by environmental policy instruments: Rüdiger K W Wurzel,
Anthony R Zito and Andrew J Jordan, Environmental Governance in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of  the Use of
New Environmental Policy Instruments (Edward Elgar 2013) 47.
30   Turner and Brennan (n 10).
31   Typically, in the form of  a non-departmental public body (NDPB).
32   Burke et al (n 9) 50–3.
33   Ibid 50.
34   Ibid.
35   For example, one highly criticised arrangement meant that district councils in Northern Ireland held
responsibility for both operational and regulatory functions associated with waste management until 2004.
This was identified as very problematic as far back as 1990 by a report of  the House of  Commons Select
Committee (n 4).
36   This problem has been raised by the CJI on a number of  occasions: CJI 2007, CJI 2011 and CJI 2015 (n 8).
allegiance of  successive environment ministers.37 The recent reorganisation of
government departments has also arguably enhanced the risk of  agency-capture by
increasing the proximity between the regulator and the regulated community within the
new Department of  Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA).38
Resistance to any change to the current arrangements and particularly to the
externalisation of  environmental regulation in Northern Ireland has been persistent and
is demonstrative of  the gross politicisation of  environmental issues in this jurisdiction.
Historically, maintaining a viable workload for the old Department of  the Environment
(DOE) arguably required the presence of  the NIEA, which represented a large part of
its daily business.39 This consideration was particularly relevant in the mid-2000s, when
removal of  the NIEA would have essentially forced the very unstable power-sharing
Executive to undertake a review of  how executive responsibilities were divided across
government departments.40 Until recently therefore, it could be argued that preserving
the NIEA within the DOE was essential to maintaining the correct number of
government departments in support of  power-sharing arrangements. Given the
constitutional and political balancing act that surrounded the make-up of  various
departments and the need to ‘spread out’ responsibilities for key government functions
across departmental and political divides, this was undoubtedly one of  the primary
(although not officially acknowledged) reasons for maintaining the status quo for many
years.41 However, although this particular driver for a centralised environmental regulator
was removed after departmental reshuffles in 2016 when the NIEA was subsumed within
the new DAERA, political resistance to externalisation of  the regulatory function has
nevertheless been retained.42
The explanations for this tenacious resistance to independent environmental
regulation are varied. However, it is worth noting that all political parties (and direct rule
ministers) have indicated support for an IEPA at some point within the last decade –
except for the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) which has persistently halted debates
around the issue in the face of  both political opposition and overwhelming public
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37   Turner and Brennan (n 10). Recent examples throw this issue into sharp resolution. With the transfer of  the
NIEA to the new DAERA, concerns surrounding the ability of  the NIEA to effectively regulate agricultural
pollution have been rife. The SDLP Minister for the Environment, Mark Durkan, halted negotiations
surrounding a Memorandum of  Understanding (MOU) between the NIEA and the Ulster Farmers Union
(UFU) due to concerns that it would force the NIEA to treat agricultural polluters with more leniency than
other industries. This decision was supported by ENGOS, but was simply reversed when the DUP Minister
Michelle McIlveen took over the running of  the Department in May 2016. See ‘Ulster Farmers Union Seeking
to Reverse SDLP Minister’s Veto on Agricultural Pollution Plan’ Irish News (Belfast, 30 May 2016)
<www.irishnews.com/news/2016/05/30/news/ulster-farmers-union-seeking-to-reverse-sdlp-minister-s-
veto-on-agricultural-pollution-plan-537872/>.
38   Turner and Brennan (n 10). The political influence that major industry or other stakeholders (e.g. the
agricultural community) hold over regulators and rule-makers, as well as common interests between the
regulated community and the regulator, have been identified as key triggers for agency-capture. See Philip
Lowe, Judy Clark, Susanne Seymour and Neil Ward, Moralizing the Environment: Countryside Change, Farming and
Pollution (UCL Press 1997). This risk has clearly been exacerbated by the merging of  DARD and the DOE
and the continued location of  the NIEA within this new department. 
39   Turner and Brennan (n 10) 523.
40   Ibid. In 2008, when Arlene Foster (who was at that time the DUP Minister for the Environment) rejected the
need for an IEPA, devolution had only been recently restored after its collapse between 2002–2007. 
41   Ibid.
42   Minister for Agriculture, the Environment and Rural Affairs, Michelle McIlveen, stated in September 2016
that she had no intention of  establishing an IEPA. ‘Oral Answers to Questions — Agriculture, Environment
and Rural Affairs’ in the Northern Ireland Assembly at 3:15 pm on 20 September 2016
<www.theyworkforyou.com/ni/?id=2016-10-25.3.76>.
support.43 With DUP ministers holding the environmental portfolio intermittently over
the last decade,44 any consultative exercises examining the issue of  an IEPA carried out
by environment ministers from other parties (notably the Social Democratic and Labour
Party’s (SDLP) Alex Attwood45 and Mark H Durkan)46 have simply been discontinued
once the ministerial portfolio has changed hands to the DUP. In the face of  such forceful
rebuttal from Northern Ireland’s largest political party,47 the frustration of  attempts to
establish an IEPA has thus far been successful. It has been suggested that the reasons for
the DUP’s pronounced antipathy towards the establishment of  an IEPA relate to its
aggressive focus on economic development (which it presumably believes would be
stymied by interference from an environmental regulator) and the party’s need to appease
sections of  its electorate that might benefit from ‘light-touch’ regulation.48 The party
itself  has in the past stated that it ‘take[s] the environment too seriously’ to externalise
regulation. However, given the tidal wave of  criticism that has engulfed the performance
of  the environmental regulator in recent history (not to mention the RHI scandal), this
particular assertion seems increasingly difficult to justify.49
3.2 A SHORT-SIGHTED AND FRAGMENTED APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY-MAKING
Another recurring theme in critiques of  Northern Ireland’s environmental governance
relates to numerous policy decisions made by the devolved government that have had, or
have the potential to have, a negative environmental impact. The resistance to making
political commitments relating to climate change,50 ineffective policy-making surrounding
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43   Turner and Brennan (n 10) 517.
44   At the time of  writing (early June 2017) there was no DAERA Minister in place as the Stormont institutions
had not yet been established following their collapse in January 2017. Prior to the collapse of  the devolved
assembly, the Minister for Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs was Michelle McIlveen (DUP) who
took ministerial responsibility for the newly formed DAERA in May 2016. Before the formation of  DAERA
in May 2016, Mark H Durkan (SDLP) was the Minister for the Environment for the DOE. Durkan was
preceded by Alex Attwood (SDLP) who held the office from May 2011 until July 2013. When devolution was
restored in 2007, the DUP held the environment portfolio until May 2011 when the SDLP took over. DUP
Environment Ministers during this period were Edwin Poots (July 2009–May 2011), Sammy Wilson (June
2008–June 2009) and Arlene Foster (May 2007–June 2008).
45   DOE, Environmental Governance in Northern Ireland: A Discussion Document (DOE 2011).
46   DOE, Environmental Governance in Northern Ireland: Discussion Document (DOE 2015) <www.daera-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/consultations/doe/environmental-governance-paper.pdf>.
47   While the DUP remains Northern Ireland’s biggest political party in terms of  first preference votes, Sinn
Féin’s strong performance in the most recent election (March 2017) means that there is now only one
assembly seat between the two parties. Henry McDonald and Jamie Grierson, ‘Sinn Féin Makes Major Gains
in Northern Ireland Elections’ The Guardian (London, 4 March 2017)
<www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/03/dup-and-sinn-fein-on-course-to-dominate-northern-ireland-
assembly>.
48   The DUP has persistently sought relaxation of  agricultural regulation, see Turner and Brennan (n 10) 521;
Brennan (n 2) 495. Most recently, establishing a highly criticised MOU with the UFU (n 37).
49   Ministerial Statement on Environmental Governance, Minutes of  the Northern Ireland Assembly (27 May 2008)
<http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/record/reports2007/080527.htm>.
50   Sharon Turner, ‘Northern Ireland’s Consent to the Climate Change Act 2008: Symbol or Illusion?’ (2013)
25(1) Journal of  Environmental Law 63–93; Sharon Turner, ‘Committing to Effective Climate Governance in
Northern Ireland: A Defining Test of  Devolution’ (2013) 25(2) Journal of  Environmental Law 203–34;
Thomas Muinzer, ‘Warming Up: Northern Ireland’s Developing Response to Climate Change in the Context
of  UK Devolution’ (September/October 2016) 96 UKELA E-Law 19.
mineral abstraction,51 policies that have failed to protect important natural resources,52
policy proposals with the potential to erode public participation in environmental
decision-making53 and planning decisions that have resulted in damage to important
natural (and cultural) heritage sites54 have all been well documented. In addition, although
Northern Ireland has an abundance of  environmental policies and strategies, there is a
lack of  any overarching strategic policy or vision of  the environment in this jurisdiction
and policy (like arrangements for enforcement) is produced in a siloed and fragmented
way.55 This has contributed to a confusing, and sometimes conflicting, policy framework
in areas such as transport, environment, land-use planning, education and social
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51   A litany of  concerns has surrounded the process whereby planning permission was granted to Dalradian for
an exploratory gold mine near Gortin, Co Tyrone. Connla Young, ‘Tyrone Residents Voice Fears over Cyanide
Goldmine Plan’ Irish News (Belfast, 5 February 2016) <www.irishnews.com/news/2016/02/05/news/tyrone-
residents-voice-fears-over-cyanide-gold-mine-plan-407011/> and for detail on the alleged procedural
irregularities <https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/10-concerns-about-dalradian-gold-
mine-75430.pdf>.
52   For example, government support of  the controversial exploratory drilling for oil at a site near Woodburn
Forest near Carrickfergus in 2016 attracted criticism from environmental activists across Ireland, who feared
water pollution and the release of  contaminants. Ultimately, no exploitable oil was discovered. However, the
DUP’s Sammy Wilson (a previous Northern Ireland Environment Minister) said of  the explorations: ‘I hope
they find as much oil in Carrickfergus as there is in Texas. If  it becomes the centre of  the oil industry in the
UK I will be over the moon in terms of  investment for the area, jobs for the area, the potential for spin-off
industry. It will be like Christmas come early.’ Gerry Moriarty, ‘Environmental Battle as InfraStrat hunt for
Antrim Oil’ Irish Times (Belfast, 23 May 2016) <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/
environment/environmental-battle-as-infrastrata-hunts-for-antrim-oil-1.2656902>. 
53   For example, in 2013 the Department of  Justice issued a consultation on proposals to revise the costs-capping
scheme for eligible environmental challenges. The Northern Ireland Environment Link (representing many
of  Northern Ireland’s environmental NGOs) issued comments on the proposals expressing concern that they
would unnecessarily (further) frustrate the ability of  environmental NGOs to challenge environmental
decisions via judicial review in a context where very few environmental decisions were being challenged in this
way. Northern Ireland Environment Link, ‘Costs Protection in Environmental Cases: Department of  Justice
Proposals to Revise the Costs Capping Scheme for Eligible Environmental Challenges – Comments by
Northern Ireland Environment Link (February, 2016) <www.nienvironmentlink.org/cmsfiles/NIEL-
response-DoJ-Costs-Protection-consultation.pdf>.
54   A recent example relates to the widespread campaigning targeted at the upgrading and rerouting of  the A6
motorway from Belfast to Derry through the Lough Beg Wetlands which is designated as a Ramsar site, an
Area of  Special Scientific Interest and a Special Protected Area. In addition, the area is of  cultural significance
as the homeland of  the renowned poet Seamus Heaney. Despite concerted campaigning by Friends of  the
Earth (NI) and a legal challenge brought by a private individual against the government’s decision, the
development looks set to go ahead – even though, at the time of  writing, there is no government in place and
the development is based on an environmental assessment over 10 years old. Friends of  the Earth (NI)
‘Disrespecting Everyday Miracles and the Living Past: The Lough Beg Wetlands and the A6 Road’ (Urgent
Briefing, March 2017) <www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/lough-beg-wetlands-a6-road-
103190.pdf>; Alan Erwin, ‘Environmentalist Loses Challenge to Derry Dual Carriageway’ Irish Times (Belfast,
28 March 2017) <www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/environmentalist-loses-challenge-to-derry-dual-
carriageway-1.3028046>.
55   For example, DOE, Valuing Nature. A Biodiversity Strategy for Northern Ireland to 2020 (DOE 2015); Northern
Ireland Executive, Everyone’s Involved. Sustainable Development Strategy (Northern Ireland Executive 2010); DOE,
Delivering Resource Efficiency: Northern Ireland Waste Management Strategy (DOE 2015); Department for Regional
Development, Sustainable Water: A Long-Term Water Strategy for Northern Ireland (Department for Regional
Development 2014).
development.56 The problem is compounded by a lack of  integration, cooperation and
communication relating to environmental issues within the Northern Ireland Executive.57
The RHI scandal represented a classic example of  this fragmented approach to
environmental governance, where a deeply flawed renewable energy incentive scheme
produced by one department (the Department of  Enterprise Trade and Investment) was
being promoted by another department (the Department of  Agriculture and Rural
Development (DARD)) that appeared blissfully unaware of  its catastrophic economic
implications.58 The DOE at the time seemed to have very little input into what was
essentially an environmental scheme. However, as well as highlighting an inherently
disorganised and fragmented approach, the RHI scheme in Northern Ireland also
demonstrated a more fundamental cultural problem that characterises political attitudes
towards the environment in this jurisdiction and seems to underpin policy decisions.
While in principle the RHI scheme was designed to assist businesses in moving towards
renewable energy resources, in Northern Ireland this principle was implemented with a
more central focus of  providing economic support to industry.59 Any environmentally
beneficial aspect to the scheme was at best sidelined and at the worst reversed, so
businesses could profit from funds designed to promote renewable energy – in some
cases allegedly heating empty sheds to generate the profits from using more and more
renewable energy resources through the scheme.60 The corruption of  the ‘cash for ash’
RHI scheme is thus indicative of  a dominant perception within Northern Ireland’s
political class that environmental costs are merely overheads in the business of  promoting
or supporting economic development and that funding schemes and policies are there to
be manipulated for financial gain.
The fragmented policy landscape is also underpinned by a legislative framework that
remains some years behind other parts of  the UK and a legislature that has been under
constant pressure to keep ‘up to speed’ with EU standards of  environmental protection.
On the one hand, important developments such as waste management licensing, an
integrated system of  environmental permitting and reform of  environmental sanctions
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 68(2)132
56   A key example of  conflicting policies relates to planning decisions and protection of  nature conservation
areas, see, for example, Friends of  the Earth (NI) (n 54). Restructuring and reform of  the planning system
(involving the transfer of  responsibility for preparation for Local Development Plans to local councils) and
the publication of  the recent Strategic Planning Policy Statement for Northern Ireland have the potential to
significantly improve the strategic approach to planning: DOE, ‘Strategic Planning Policy Statement for
Northern Ireland’ (DOE September 2015) <www.planningni.gov.uk/index/policy/
spps_28_september_2015-3.pdf>.
57   Burke et al (n 9) 42.
58   Sean O’Driscoll and Claire O’Boyle, ‘Sinn Féin’s Michelle O’Neill in Firing Line over RHI as Role of  her
Department in Hyping Faulty Scheme Revealed’ Belfast Telegraph (Belfast, 28 January 2017)
<www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/rhi-scandal/sinn-Féin s-michelle-oneill-in-firing-line-over-rhi-as-role-of-
her-department-in-hyping-faulty-scheme-revealed-35404342.html>. The NIAO reported on the flawed
scheme in July 2016 and again in June 2017, ultimately concluding that there are ‘significant concerns about
the operation of  this scheme and the serious systemic weaknesses in controls that have facilitated the
possibility of  funding that is at best not in line with the spirit of  the scheme and at worst is fraudulent’.
Although a revised subsidy tariff  introduced in 2017 has the potential to vastly reduce the annual cost of  the
scheme to the Northern Ireland block from £30 million per year to £2 million, the new tiered rate is subject
to an ongoing judicial review which has challenged the ability of  the department to significantly vary the
subsidy rates: NIAO, Department for the Economy Resource Accounts 2016–2017 (NIAO June 2017)
<www.niauditoffice.gov.uk/sites/niao/files/media-files/CAG%20Report%202016–17%20Final.pdf>.
59   Muinzer (n 1).
60   Ibid 19–20.
have been gradually introduced, or are in the process of  being introduced.61 However,
these developments have occurred belatedly and there are still aspects of  environmental
law in Northern Ireland which require significant updating to bring them into line with
other parts of  the UK.62 In addition, the well-known practice of  directly replicating
Westminster’s environmental legislation into Northern Irish environmental law with
minimal local input is problematic. Although there are practical reasons for this approach
given the mammoth task of  transposing EU directives and the limited resources available
to do so, failure to develop a context-specific legislative framework for environmental
protection makes it difficult to implement and there is a risk that the actual legal thinking
and understanding of  the legislation will not be passed on or inform actual practice.63
On the other hand, the pivotal role that the EU has played as a driver for
environmental law development in Northern Ireland has always been evident, but has
been thrown into sharp resolution in the wake of  the UK referendum to leave the EU.64
Although the UK as a whole would be in breach of  its EU law obligations if
environmental directives are not transposed and implemented in Northern Ireland,
subsequent to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 the devolved government rather than
Westminster is liable for the cost of  any financial sanctions imposed for this failure.65 The
potentially crippling financial implications of  this responsibility have essentially driven
environmental law reforms in subsequent years. An impressive programme of  legislative
modernisation in the early 2000s occurred only in response to infraction threats from the
European Commission for failure to transpose environmental directives.66 Specific
problems existed in relation to the Bathing Waters Directive, the Waste Framework
Directive, the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive and the Drinking
Water Quality Directive.67 Between 2001 and 2004, 45 separate pieces of  legislation were
adopted to remedy these deficiencies in direct pursuit of  compliance with EU law and to
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61   Criticism of  Northern Ireland’s failure to modernise its environmental legislation began back in 1990, when
the House of  Commons Select Committee on the Environment highlighted the extent of  the antiquation
within Northern Ireland’s environmental law regimes: House of  Commons Select Committee on the
Environment (n 4) paras 32–3.
62   For example, the overly complex laws relating to packaging waste regulation and producer responsibility. The
DAERA is currently consulting on consolidation of  these rules. See, DAERA, Consultation Document on
Consolidation of  the Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2007 (as
amended) (2016) <www.daera-ni.gov.uk/consultations/packaging-waste-regulations-northern-ireland-2016>.
Another critical issue is the absence of  a properly functioning contaminated land regime. See, Brian Jack,
‘Environmental Law in Northern Ireland’ in Stephen McKay and Michael Murray, Planning Law and Practice in
Northern Ireland (Routledge 2017) 154–5. One positive recent development is the provision for the integration
of  permitting systems via the Environmental Better Regulation Act (NI) 2016.
63   An example of  this occurred when the rush to copy over waste legislation by DOE policy-makers in the early
2000s in order to avoid EU infraction proceedings was entirely at odds with the ability of  the Environment
and Heritage Service (EHS) to effectively enforce and implement the legislation within the necessary
timeframe: Brennan (n 2) 478.
64   The potential impact of  Brexit on environmental governance in Northern Ireland more generally will be
discussed in more detail in section 5.
65   As a function of  the MOU and supplementary agreements relating to devolution, Northern Ireland is liable
for payment of  any infraction fines imposed by the European Commission on the UK for failure to
implement European directives that fall within the responsibility of  the Northern Ireland Assembly: Office
of  the Deputy Prime Minister, Memorandum of  Understanding and Supplementary Agreements: between the
United Kingdom Government, Scottish Ministers and the Cabinet of  the National Assembly for Wales and
the Northern Ireland Executive Committee (Cm 5420, 2001) para B4.25.
66   Turner 2006a (n 11).
67   Jack (n 62) 155.
avoid infraction proceedings and subsequent fines.68 Since this unprecedented period of
legislative modernisation, the spectre of  EU infraction fines has continued to exert
pressure on Northern Ireland’s environmental legislators to update water, air, pollution
prevention and control and biodiversity regimes – albeit slowly and imperfectly.69 While
concern about the risk of  post-Brexit dilution of  environmental standards has been
expressed across the UK (and will be addressed in more detail below), the EU’s role as
the primary motivating force behind any form of  legislative modernisation in Northern
Ireland arguably elevates the chances of  its environmental law and policy framework
stagnating, or even decaying in a post-Brexit scenario.
3.3 CATASTROPHIC REGULATORY AND ENFORCEMENT FAILURES
Possibly the most persistent theme that has dominated discussions surrounding
environmental governance in Northern Ireland is the real and perceived failure to
implement environmental regulation in practice and the resistance, or lethargy, with which
government has responded to reports that have criticised its performance. This
demonstrates not only antipathy towards environmental protection, but also blatant
disregard for the scrutiny bodies established to audit and monitor regulatory
performance.70 The problematic approach to regulation does not relate to any one
distinct category of  environmental harm but is endemic and indicative of  a systemic
failure to regulate environmentally harmful activities. While recent commentary has
focused on the particularly visible issue of  waste management,71 critiques of  regulation
span all areas of  the environment including illegal quarrying and mineral extraction,
planning,72 water pollution from agriculture and sewage, and the protection of  designated
conservation sites.73 Although the entire process of  regulation has been problematic, one
of  the most criticised functions of  the NIEA has been its approach to enforcement of
environmental law, almost all aspects of  which have been the subject of  intense
condemnation.74 Key issues relate to the NIEA’s enforcement policy, its fragmented
internal structure, the lack of  an internal legal team, problems with prosecution of
environmental crime by both the NIEA and the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) and the
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68   Turner 2006a (n 11) 65.
69   Jack (n 62) 155.
70   For example, in relation to water pollution, the NIAO report published in 1998 (n 5) criticised DOE for failing
to respond to the Halcrow Report (William Halcrow, Efficiency Study of  the Environmental Protection Division of  the
Department of  the Environment (NI) (Department of  the Environment 1989) and the PAC report published in
2000 (n 7) similarly criticised the department for failing to respond to the NIAO recommendations. In 1990
Milton (K Milton, Our Countryside, Our Concern: Policy and Practice of  Conservation in Northern Ireland (Northern
Ireland Environment Link 1990)) reported only a ‘partial’ implementation of  the previous Balfour
recommendations (J Balfour, A New Look at the Northern Ireland Countryside (HMSO 1984) relating to nature
conservation in 1984). In 2006 the PAC (House of  Commons Committee of  Public Accounts, Northern
Ireland’s Waste Management Strategy (HC 2005–06, 741)) criticised the DOE for failure to respond to the
recommendations of  the WMAB in 2004 (Waste Management Advisory Board for Northern Ireland, Waste
Management Strategy Review Report (EHS 2004)). In 2007, CJI (n 8) criticised the DOE generally for its failure to
respond to previous criticisms.
71   Brennan (n 2); CJI 2015 (n 8); and Mills (n 12).
72   Planning functions were transferred to local councils in 2015. For analysis of  this process, see Stephen McKay
and Michael Murray, Planning Law and Practice in Northern Ireland (Routledge 2017). Enforcement of  planning
law has historically been highly problematic, e.g. Stephen McKay and Michael Murray, ‘In Pursuit of
Regulatory Compliance: A Study of  Planning Enforcement Structures in Northern Ireland’ (2014) 85(3) Town
Planning Review 387–410.
73   For a detailed analysis of  reports into the problems with environmental regulation across these areas, see
Brennan (n 28) 19–50.
74   Ibid.
sentences imposed in environmental prosecutions.75 Despite significant effort from
regulatory staff  working within the NIEA, current regulatory arrangements are notably
falling behind those in neighbouring countries.
The enforcement policy of  the NIEA is not sufficiently detailed to provide a
transparent account of  the agency’s overall approach.76 While the policy has been
reformed in recent years, it remains a short and undetailed document which contrasts
significantly with the comprehensive policy and guidance documents produced by, for
example, the English Environment Agency (EA).77 This has the potential to create
uncertainty about the NIEA’s approach to enforcement both within the agency itself  and
within the regulated community. This uncertainty is exacerbated by the lack of  any
centralised enforcement unit within the NIEA, where enforcement is fragmented across
the whole organisation leading to a disparate and inconsistent approach and gaps in the
enforcement response.78 The implications of  this fragmented approach were thrown into
sharp resolution with the discovery of  the massive illegal dump at Mobuoy in County
Derry in 2014. The ‘superdump’, now recognised as one of  the biggest illegal dump sites
in Europe, was created by environmental criminals masquerading behind the front of  a
legitimate, licensed recycling company.79 It has since emerged that one of  the most
significant problems with the regulation of  the site in question was that there were
essentially multiple parts of  the NIEA (and local councils) with responsibility for discrete
categories of  environmental regulation dealing with different aspects of  the operation.80
Within the NIEA, the Environmental Crime Unit (ECU) eventually began dealing with
the ‘serious’ crime aspect of  the offending when its scale became clear in 2012.81 The
Land and Resource Management Unit issued the operators of  the site with a licence and
were (supposed to be) regulating the licensed activities for years before the illegal
dumping was discovered.82 The Water Management Unit had responded to reports of
water pollution in the nearby River Faughan83 and because there are designated protected
sites nearby the Conservation, Designation and Protection team also had responsibilities
to ensure those sites were not harmed.84 In addition to these multiple NIEA teams, the
local council had also responded to issues relating to pest control and nuisance odours
emitting from the site.85 The complex regulation of  the site and a lack of  an integrated
approach or communication between the various teams dealing with the operations at
Mobuoy essentially created a scenario where the serious offending slipped through the
cracks between the remits of  the numerous bodies involved.86 This issue has been
exacerbated in the context of  waste regulation due to the lack of  a comprehensive
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75   Ibid.
76   NIEA, Enforcement Policy (NIEA 2011) <www.daera-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/doe/niea-
enforcement-document-2011.pdf>.
77   The EA’s enforcement policy documents are available at <www.gov.uk/government/publications/
environment-agency-enforcement-and-sanctions-statement>.
78   CJI 2007 (n 8) 5, para 2.3.
79   Brennan (n 2).
80   Mills (n 12).
81   Ibid 13.
82   Ibid 11–12.
83   Ibid 12.
84   Ibid 14.
85   Ibid.
86   Brennan (n 2) 482.
protocol between the NIEA and local government establishing a clear delineation of
responsibilities for dealing with illegal disposal of  waste.87
Another recurrent issue is that the NIEA does not have its own legal team, and the lack
of  any in-house lawyers means that potential prosecutions are referred to the PPS and
handled by PPS staff  alongside all other departmental business.88 This practice is notably
out of  step with what takes place in the EA in England, Natural Resources Wales (NRW)
and in the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA).89 While the arrangement
offers flexibility in the type of  advice that can be provided by PPS staff, general
departmental lawyers will not have as much knowledge and experience as someone
specialising in one particular area and this could generate a potential imbalance in legal
specialism and a higher rate of  case ‘failure’.90 In addition, the lack of  a legal core in
DAERA means that the legal grounding for the business of  regulation is not sufficiently
embedded into the culture of  the department and the importance of  the NIEA’s
enforcement function is minimised. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that, while the
NIEA’s strategic priorities include reference to environmental crime, none of  the strategic
goals refer explicitly to this core aspect of  the NIEA’s role91 and assessments of  the
NIEA’s internal culture reflect an organisation heavily science-focused where enforcement
is perceived as a secondary function.92 The CJI in particular has highlighted the need
within the NIEA for ‘a stronger emphasis on upholding the law and removing any
ambiguity as to the management of  breaches of  the law’.93 It has also criticised how
environmental enforcement has been undertaken in respect of  discretion, consistency and
rigour. The CJI has made numerous suggestions in this regard (across several reports) that
could improve the status quo, such as strategic changes, oversight systems and better
training.
The approach to, and ‘success’ of, prosecutions for breaches of  environmental law
have also been the subject of  significant debate. This relates not only to a perception that
the NIEA does not always prosecute when it should and instead targets ‘low-hanging
fruit’ or easy wins, but also that the handling of  environmental prosecutions once they
enter the criminal justice system is highly problematic.94 Although substantial penalties
have been provided for within environmental legislation, in general, sentences imposed by
the courts fall far below the maximum penalties, below any threshold that could create a
deterrent to further commission of  environmental crime and far below the levels of
penalties imposed in other parts of  the UK.95 While sentencing guidelines were
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87   Formal ‘fly-tipping’ protocols exist elsewhere in the UK to deal with this problem. For the fly-tipping protocol
in England and Wales, see England and Wales Environment Agency and Local Government
Association/Welsh Local Government Association, Fly-tipping and Illegal Waste Activities Working Better Together
Protocol Series: Protocol 6 <http://www.flytippingactionwales.org/files/8113/5877/5049/fly-
tipping_protocol.pdf>. For the Scottish protocol, see Scottish Flytipping Forum, ‘Fly-tipping in Scotland: A
Guide to Prevention and Enforcement’ (December 2010) <http://dumbdumpers.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/Flytipping-in-Scotland-A-Guide-to-Prevention-and-Enforcement.pdf> 34.
88   NIEA (n 58) 5.
89   Brennan (n 28) 201–7.
90   The CJI found that on average around 25% of  cases referred to the PPS by the NIEA’s Environmental Crime
Unit failed the test for prosecution: CJI (2015) (n 8) 34. 
91   Ibid. In 2015, the CJI concluded that: ‘A key strategic document for the NIEA is its Strategic Priorities for
2012–22. The document states that “When standards are breached or crime detected we investigate and
pursue offenders vigorously.”’
92   Ibid 6.
93   Ibid.
94   Brennan (n 28) 197–276.
95   Ibid and CJI 2007 (n 8).
eventually produced in Northern Ireland in 2012, it remains unclear as to whether these
guidelines have had any meaningful impact on the levels of  fines imposed.96 Northern
Ireland is also well behind the rest of  the UK in its ability to have an effective programme
of  environmental sanctions. Penalties for breaches of  environmental legislation in
Northern Ireland are currently nearly always applied through the criminal justice system,
whereas other jurisdictions have been expanding the applicability of  a wider range of
sanctions (e.g. enforcement undertakings), from some discrete sectors like packaging, into
new environmental regimes.97 A commitment from (the then DUP Environment
Minister) Arlene Foster in 2008 to deliver a new sanctioning regime as part of  her
programme of  regulatory reform has yet to come to fruition.98
4 The impact and implications of weak environmental governance
Significant dysfunction and regulatory failure have clearly characterised Northern
Ireland’s environmental governance experience to date and it is clear that almost all of  the
features highlighted in the EPI framework are either entirely absent or seriously
compromised. There is a clear lack of  political commitment and strategic vision in terms
of  environmental protection. This has been demonstrated at all policy levels, from the
failure to externalise regulation and remove the risk of  political interference at a structural
level, to weak environmental policy-making where economic development has
unapologetically trumped environmental protection and an absence of  political will to
enhance environmental regulation has been displayed even in the face of  catastrophic
failures. There is a highly fragmented approach to environmental governance at Executive
level as well as within the NIEA. This demonstrates a profound lack of  policy integration
and is representative of  an administrative culture and set of  practices that fail to enable
co-operation between actors involved in environmental protection, facilitate coordination
of  plans and strategies and deliver environmental decision-making in a transparent way.
The superficial degree of  environmental policy integration also displays little concern for
the long-term impacts of  weak environmental governance or sustainable development.
There has been a significant lack of  innovation in terms of  using policy instrument design
and application in a context-specific way, with an over-reliance on replicating
developments in other parts of  the UK in spite of  distinctive regional challenges (e.g.
cross-border waste crime). Although monitoring and publication of  state-of-the-
environment reporting occurs, a key issue has been government’s failure to respond to
either indicators of  environmental degradation or to criticism of  government policy and
practice by the scrutiny community. The divergence from what can be considered ‘good’
environmental governance is clear and the environmental, economic and socio-political
consequences of  these failures cannot now be overestimated.
Recently published figures portray a stark, and in many cases declining, assessment of
the state of  Northern Ireland’s environmental and natural resources. As of  2015, only 33
per cent of  Northern Ireland’s rivers, 24 per cent of  its lakes and 36 per cent of  marine
waterbodies met the Water Framework Directive targets of  good ecological status.99
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96   Available at <www.jsbni.com/Publications/sentencing-guides-magistrates-court/Pages/Environment-
Offences.aspx>. In July 2017 a County Tyrone farmer was fined only £500 for the illegal disposal of  over
2000 tonnes of  waste in an area of  birch bog on his land. ‘Tyrone man fined £500 over tonnes of  illegal waste’
BBC News (BBC, 10 July 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-40558040>.
97   Introduced by the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 in England and Wales and Environmental
Regulation (Enforcement Measures) (Scotland) Order 2015 in Scotland.
98   Ministerial Statement (n 56) 3–4.
99   DAERA, Northern Ireland Environmental Statistics Report March 2016 <www.daera-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/doe/ni-environmental-statistics-report-2016.pdf> 40, 54.
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DAERA also reported in 2015 that the total number of  reported water pollution
incidents had increased by 6 per cent compared with the last reported year and the
number of  substantiated incidents had increased by 11 per cent compared with 2012.100
In addition to poor water quality in rivers, lakes and marine water bodies, Northern
Ireland’s natural heritage sites and wildlife also appear to be at significant risk. In relation
to natural heritage, 33 per cent of  features in protected areas were deemed as being in
unfavourable condition in 2016, compared to 30 per cent in 2015.101 Between 1994/95
and 2013/14, the total wetland bird population of  Northern Ireland is estimated to have
decreased by 26 per cent with coastal populations declining by 16 per cent and freshwater
populations by 41 per cent.102 Significant concern surrounds the maintenance of
Northern Ireland’s biodiversity, the health of  which has been ranked lowest within the
UK.103 Pollution of  the terrestrial environment is also endemic and one of  the most
significant environmental problems in Northern Ireland relates to the illegal disposal of
waste. There are hundreds of  illegal dump sites in Northern Ireland containing millions
of  tonnes of  waste (some of  which might potentially leach into watercourses and
drinking water in the future).104 More than a million cubic metres of  waste is estimated
to be buried at the Mobuoy ‘superdump’ alone.105 There does not appear to be an
adequate and visibly resourced national remediation plan to deal with these sites, nor is
there a fully functioning contaminated land regime to deal with historic pollution. The
cumulative impact of  these problems means that Northern Ireland’s environment can
now be considered to be an environment in crisis. However, given that evidence of
serious environmental degradation has thus far been ineffective in persuading Northern
Ireland’s government to undertake meaningful reform, it is unlikely that environmental
factors alone will sway politicians towards addressing these problems.
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100  Ibid 49. Agriculture accounts for the highest proportion of  water pollution incidents (26.9%), followed by
industry and other (18.5% each), domestic (18.3%) and Northern Ireland Water Ltd (16.3%). Significant
controversy surrounds the level of  penalties imposed by the courts on Northern Ireland’s single most prolific
polluter Northern Ireland Water (which was prosecuted 41 times between 2011 and 2016) and also
surrounding the regulation of  agricultural pollution incidents: ‘“Repeat Offender” Northern Ireland Water
Pays Out £80k on Pollution Fines in Five Years’ Belfast Telegraph (Belfast, 25 November 2016).
<www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/environment/repeat-offender-northern-ireland-water-pays-out-80k-on-
pollution-fines-in-five-years-35243453.html>; Suzie Cave and Des McKibbon, River Pollution in Northern
Ireland: An Overview of  Causes and Monitoring Systems, with Examples of  Preventative Measures (Northern Ireland
Assembly Research Paper NIAR 691–15 2016) <www.niassembly.gov.uk/
globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2016/environment/2016.pdf>; Conor Macauley, ‘Farmers
Union Wins Pollution Appeal’ BBC News (7 February 2017) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-
38895343>; Linda Stewart, ‘Fury at Deal to Let Farmers Escape Fines for Pollution’ Belfast Telegraph (Belfast,
6 April 2015) <www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/environment/fury-at-deal-to-let-farmers-escape-fines-for-
pollution-31119738.html>.
101  DAERA, Northern Ireland Environmental Statistics Report March 2017 <www.daera-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/daera/ni-environmental-statistics-report-2017_2.PDF> 69.
102  Ibid 73. The report notes that there is significant variability in the usage of  different sites by wild bird
populations and shifts in population may be in some cases attributable to wider climatic change.
103  The Biodiversity Intactness Index (BII) is one measure used to assess the extent of  the loss of  nature due to
human activities going back centuries. BII values below 90% indicate that ecosystems may have fallen below
the point at which they can reliably meet society’s needs. The value for Northern Ireland is 80%. Of  the 218
countries for which BII values have been calculated, Northern Ireland is ranked 24th from the bottom and is
ranked the lowest of  the UK’s four countries. State of  Nature, State of  Nature Report 2016: Northern Ireland
<www.bto.org/sites/default/files/publications/state-of-nature-report-2016-northern-ireland.pdf> 3.
104  Cormac Campbell, ‘Waking up to Waste: How Northern Ireland’s Waste Problem Could Leave a Toxic Legacy’
The Detail (Belfast ,7 November 2016) <www.thedetail.tv/articles/waking-up-to-waste-how-northern-ireland-
s-waste-problem-could-leave-a-toxic-legacy>.
105  Details on the Mobuoy dump and documents relating to the site can be found at <https://www.daera-
ni.gov.uk/articles/mobuoy-road-waste-project>.
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Perhaps the consequences of  environmental governance failings that provide the
most political mileage for change relate to the economic costs stemming from either
direct clean-up expenses associated with pollution, mitigation of  harmful pollutants
already emitted and, less tangibly, the value of  lost benefits that could have been derived
from good environmental governance. Conservative estimates suggest that resolution of
the RHI commitments alone could cost the Northern Ireland taxpayer £490 million
(never mind the £600 million that the rest of  the UK must ‘chip in’).106 A high price to
pay for at best inept application and at worst alleged political corruption of  a policy
designed to promote sustainable energy use. Although difficult to estimate because of
ongoing investigations, some repatriation costs being paid by the Republic of  Ireland for
cross-border waste107 and several remediation options, the clean-up costs resulting from
illegal dumping have the potential to reach the eye-watering figure of  £440 million. This
is comprised of  an estimated £140 million to clean up the superdump at Mobuoy Road
in Derry, £250 million to clean up previously discovered illegal dump sites and an
estimated £50 million to remediate sites currently being investigated.108 Cleaning up the
toxic by-products of  illegal fuel laundering has also cost the Northern Ireland
government £960,321 between 2012 and 2015.109 A further £28,791 was spent dealing
with problems caused to the water system by toxic sludge linked to fuel smuggling.110
Although data relating to the cost of  remediation of  damage to protected sites is
unavailable, £1 million has already been spent on developing a remediation restoration
plan after damage was caused to Strangford Lough and the Northern Ireland government
was threatened with infraction proceedings for non-compliance with the Habitats
Directive.111 Combining the cost of  RHI, cleaning up illegal dumping and fuel laundering
gives a total and already incurred cost of  over £1 billion.
Loss of  tax revenue can also be considered a direct consequence of  weak enforcement
of  environmental law. It has been estimated that illegal fuel laundering alone between 2009
and 2014 resulted in a loss of  around £400 million in lost revenue.112 For illegal waste
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107  Olivia Kelly, ‘Over 10,000 Tonnes of  Waste to Be Repatriated’ Irish Times (Belfast, 24 August 2011)
<www.irishtimes.com/news/over-10–000-tonnes-of-waste-to-be-repatriated-1.604938>. 
108  The Mills Report in 2013 (n 12) reported that the DOE had calculated that it had prosecuted 454 offenders
for the dumping of  illegal waste since 2003. Very little of  this waste appears to have been removed or
remediated. The report found that, assuming that a risk assessment required the removal of  waste from 100
of  these sites, with an average volume of  10,000m3 and a removal cost of  £215/m3 (based on the repatriation
of  waste to the Republic of  Ireland project), it would cost the Northern Ireland taxpayer £250 million. The
estimated amount of  illegal waste at the Mobuoy Road site has been reported in the Assembly and by the
NIEA Stakeholders Group in November 2015 as a volume of  1,165,155m3, crudely equating to a weight of
one-and-a-half-million tonnes. Whilst the estimated tonnage of  illegal waste has risen at the Mobuoy Road
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remediation plan. As well as Mobuoy, the NIEA currently has a further 89 enforcement cases at various stages
in the investigative/legal process, involving, approximately 561,644 tonnes of  waste the clean-up costs of
which can crudely be estimated to amount to a further £50 million. Details of  ongoing cases provided by
NIEA to author via email (9 December 2015).
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Belfast Telegraph (Belfast, 10 February 2015) <www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/illegal-fuel-
plants-bankrolling-the-dissidents-polluting-rivers-and-endangering-lives-30978239.html>. This figure did not
include the clean-up costs of  toxic material produced at fuel plants, which had to be removed following raids.
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disposal, based on the quantities already discovered at illegal dumps, the lost revenue from
avoided landfill taxes and charges could be crudely estimated as between £100–135
million.113 The Quarry Products Association has estimated that illegal quarrying costs the
exchequer at least £2 million per year in lost VAT and Aggregates Levy114 and the NIAO
is also currently investigating the issuance of  millions of  pounds in tax credits through the
Aggregate Levy Credit scheme (ALCS) to extraction companies which could have been
operating without all necessary planning and environmental consents.115
In addition to the direct costs associated with remediating environmental damage,
environmental governance failures have also created a situation where Northern Ireland
is seemingly at perpetual risk of  infraction proceedings from the EU. As previously
highlighted, although the UK as a whole would be found to be in breach of  EU
environmental directives should such a breach be identified, it would be the devolved
government that would be liable to pay the cost of  any fines imposed as a result of  failure
to transpose EU law.116 Such financial sanctions may consist of  both a daily penalty to
induce the remedy of  the breach (of  up to circa €237,864 per day, a figure which is then
multiplied by the duration of  the breach) and a lump sum (based on an assessment of  the
effects of  the breach for which the minimum for the UK is currently €9,982,000).117
Given the UK’s impending exit from the EU, it is unclear at what stage the ‘cut-off ’ point
for infraction proceedings will be, but until Brexit actually occurs EU law still applies. As
of  June 2016, there were ongoing infraction cases being brought by the European
Commission in respect of  breaches of  the Water Framework Directive, Waste Framework
Directive, Habitats Directive, Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive,
Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and Urban Waste Water Treatment
Directive.118 Failure to deal with the legacy of  illegal dumping specifically could also
attract very significant infraction fines.119 In addition, there have also been concerns
raised in the Northern Ireland Assembly about Northern Ireland potentially being in
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breach of  the Nitrates Directive,120 Safe Storage of  Metallic Mercury Wastes Directive,121
Wild Birds Directive122 and Marine Strategy Framework Directive123 – all of  which could
potentially lead to further infraction proceedings. Domestic legal action also poses a
potential financial risk. Under the Aarhus Convention, if  a government is perceived to
not be meeting its legal obligations, then public interest groups can access the justice
system and compel it to act.124 The financial implications of  going to court can be very
high and resource-intensive, negative media can be generated, and it can shine a spotlight
on the fact that the Executive is not acting.125
Less tangible are the financial benefits lost to Northern Ireland as a result of  weak
environmental governance. Protecting the environment is not a one-way cost and there
has been very little recognition in Northern Ireland of  some of  the serious economic
impacts that current systems of  environmental governance are having. A key issue here is
the potential impact on foreign direct investment (FDI). Weak environmental regulation
and the failure to uphold the rule of  law present critical disincentives to FDI, where a top
priority for investors in the last five years has been ‘stability and transparency of  political,
legal and regulatory environment’.126 The creation of  unfair competition from illegal
operators distorts markets and undermines the development of  sustainable industries,
most notably in Northern Ireland across the waste industry.127 The cost of  regulating
such high levels of  non-compliance also inevitably increases the regulatory bill and puts
further pressure on an already overstretched criminal justice system. Problems with an
unstable and unfair regulatory playing field have been exacerbated by a painfully slow
system for gaining planning permission.128 In addition, it is well established that
Northern Ireland is at risk of  infraction proceedings from Europe arising from a lack of
investment in waste-water treatment plants.129 If  treatment works are operating at, or
close to capacity, new businesses cannot be connected to the plant, unless the plant’s
capacity is extended. So, non-compliance with environmental laws, in terms of
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investments in strategic infrastructure, also presents serious challenges to FDI and
economic growth. A further risk created by a damaged environment relates to potential
damage to the tourist economy in Northern Ireland (worth £723 million annually to the
economy and sustaining 43,000 jobs).130 High-profile TV and film production in
Northern Ireland is also placed in jeopardy when the natural environment which has
attracted that industry in the first place is damaged or at risk.131
In addition to serious environmental and economic consequences, the centralised
nature of  environmental governance and political profligacy towards environmental
concerns in Northern Ireland have enfeebled the development, culture and campaigning
approach of  the many within the ENGO community operating in this jurisdiction. An
underdeveloped ENGO sector with a traditional focus on local environmental justice
issues is arguably a feature of  civil society on the island of  Ireland132 and the diminution
of  environmental movements in post-conflict societies is a well-recognised
phenomenon.133 However, the situation in Northern Ireland has been compounded by
apparent reluctance of  many within the ENGO sector to engage in high-profile public
criticism of  environmental policy and regulatory efforts.134
There are a number of  reasons for this. First and foremost, many ENGOs rely on
funding from the government department within which the environmental regulator is
located and to publicly object to any aspect of  the regulator’s performance could create
at least a perception that criticism might place that funding in jeopardy.135 Secondly, given
the small scale of  regulatory operations within the NIEA, it is easy for criticism to
become highly personalised. This arguably creates an aversion to engaging in openly
confrontational campaigning tactics which is intensified by the cross-pollination between
existing and former government senior staff  now highly placed within governance and
management frameworks of  ENGOs.136 Thirdly, in the absence of  a robust and vocal
environmental champion (i.e. an independent environmental regulator), the ‘operational
risks and organisational burdens’137 associated with environmental lobbying in Northern
Ireland have been exponentially increased. This means that, on the one hand, there is a
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far weightier responsibility placed on ENGOs to act in a scrutiny and lobbying role and,
on the other hand, creates far higher stakes for doing so.138 There is a perception that
some ENGOs have lost some of  their distinctiveness and independence and have
become (or are becoming) like an arms-length public body that is only consulted, and
listened too, on a selective basis by government.
Evidence of  the Northern Irish ENGO community’s vulnerability to political
developments is replete throughout the history of  the governance debate. In the mid-
2000s a high-profile public campaign for an IEPA brought together nine of  Northern
Ireland’s most influential ENGOs in an unprecedented cooperative attempt to influence
decision-making on environmental governance.139 Despite effectively lobbying the direct
rule government into agreeing to undertake a review of  environmental governance, once
devolution was reinstated after a period of  suspension, the devolved government
unceremoniously rejected the findings of  the independent review panel when the DUP
blocked the externalisation of  environmental regulation to an IEPA.140 The ability of  one
party to essentially steamroll over the combined efforts of  the ENGO coalition (which,
it should be noted, had the support of  all other political parties) coupled with the
desultory manner in which years of  work had been nullified led to the rapid disintegration
of  the coalition and ushered in a period of  dejection and timidity in environmental
lobbying. A brief  flurry of  lobbying activity followed in the wake of  funding cuts in 2014,
but once funding was reinstated many in the ENGO community once again seemed
placated.141 The merging of  the DOE and DARD into the new DAERA in 2016 was
accompanied by significant concerns, particularly in relation to the regulation of
agricultural pollution.142 These concerns, coupled with the removal of  the political need
to preserve the DOE’s core workload and some political support for re-examining the
idea of  establishing an IEPA led to a recent reignition of  ENGO activity in the
environmental governance debate. Since the collapse of  the devolved government,
however, the lobbying activity of  many government-funded ENGOs seems to have once
again diminished.143
5 Environmental governance in a shifting political landscape
Given the scale of  the problems experienced in Northern Ireland and the severe
consequences of  environmental governance failures, it is clear that urgent reform is now
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required. Not only is there a need to address the serious environmental impact of  years
of  neglect and stem the tide of  environmental damage still occurring because of  non-
compliance with environmental law, but the economic consequences of  governance
failures are also looming. However, given the seismic political shifts occurring not only in
Northern Ireland, but on the island of  Ireland, within the UK, Europe and beyond, there
is a need to contextualise these problems and any suggestions for reform in the face of
wider political developments. On a local level, while the collapse of  the Stormont
administration in December 2016 has created significant uncertainty about the future of
devolved politics in Northern Ireland, it may also present an opportunity to re-insert the
issue of  an IEPA into political discussions.144 The DUP’s loss of  the controversial
petition of  concern might at least offer an opportunity for other political parties which
support the proposition of  an arms-length regulator to achieve this long-gestating
ambition should an Executive be formed.145 However, with significant doubt remaining
as to how the political situation in Northern Ireland will unfold in the short to medium
term (especially given concerns surrounding the DUP–Conservative political deal in the
wake of  the June 2017 Westminster elections), forming a stable government is a challenge
that must be overcome first.146 With negotiations surrounding issues such as an Irish
Language Act, legacy inquest funding, marriage equality and a referendum on Irish
reunification leading the list of  negotiating terms for Sinn Féin, and the DUP focused on
stemming the nationalist voting resurgence displayed in the 2016 Assembly elections and
delivering the portfolio of  economic benefits controversially negotiated in exchange for
supporting the Conservative government, there is a risk of  environmental governance
once again being sidelined from mainstream political debate.147 Alternatively, should one
of  the main political parties recognise the importance of  the issue and add it to their
negotiating terms, the political disarray might offer an opportunity to raise the issue up
the political agenda. In the event of  the re-establishment of  UK direct rule or some form
of  combined rule from Dublin and London, questions surrounding who will ‘foot the
bill’ for the legacy of  environmental governance dysfunction in Northern Ireland may
play a prominent role – not least the continuing prospect of  EU infraction fines.
While there is obviously a need to consider Northern Ireland, all-island and UK
political dimensions to the environmental governance debate, any suggestions for reform
must clearly take account of  direct and tangential consequences of  the Brexit process.
Here, the form of  the UK’s Brexit deal (presuming one is actually negotiated) will dictate
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the future of  environmental law in the UK and ultimately the degree to which the
devolved governments can diverge from current standards of  protection.148 At the time
of  writing, this remains shrouded in significant uncertainty.149 A critical issue will be
whether the UK remains part of  the Single Market, which will dictate the extent to which
the UK must continue to comply with EU environmental directives.150 If  the UK remains
part of  the European Economic Area it will still be bound by many EU laws, including
significant environmental directives such as the Waste Management Directive and the
Water Framework Directive, but the UK’s ability to influence future development and
changes to environmental standards would be removed.151 In principle this would limit
the UK’s ability to introduce variations to its own environmental standards and, because
most environmental matters are devolved, would also prevent devolved administrations
embarking on ‘solo-runs’ as ultimately large swathes of  environmental management
would still be subject to EU law.152
Conversely, and although still constrained by the UK’s international legal obligations,
should the UK leave the Single Market much of  the legal requirement to comply with EU
environmental law could be removed. Although this would be substantially mitigated by
the UK’s international obligations and any new arrangements negotiated as part of  the
Brexit agreement, the possibility of  any reduction in standards of  protection derived
from EU law and policy has generated significant concern amongst environmentalists.153
In evidence to the UK’s Environmental Audit Committee, stakeholders have expressed
fears that Brexit could lead to environmental law becoming diluted in order to reduce
regulation and enhance the UK’s competitiveness,154 despite recent Conservative party
assurances to the contrary.155 Given that the DUP’s 2017 election manifesto contained no
reference whatsoever to the environment and its (and the Conservative government’s)
history of  a preference for light-touch environmental regulation,156 the prospect of
unfettered devolved ability to vary environmental standards is cause for significant
concern in the local context. A UK ‘bonfire of  regulations’ would also necessarily result
in EU counter-measures which could be highly detrimental to, for example, trade between
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Northern Ireland and the Republic of  Ireland.157 Media have reported that the UK
government’s threats to becoming a low tax, low regulation state in the absence of  an
agreement on market access158 have already prompted the European Parliament to
consider mechanisms through which any exit deal would essentially hinge upon UK
maintenance of  existing environmental standards and that this could be enforced through
a pan-European court of  arbitration.159 Whether any enforcement mechanisms bestowed
upon this court would result in devolved government financial liability for fines imposed
in response to falling environmental standards would clearly be a significant driver for
ensuring UK-wide compliance.160 A connected risk is that divergence across the
constituent parts of  the UK would lead to a very problematic degree of  fragmentation of
environmental law regimes across the UK were no alternative ‘brake’ put on this
process.161 This could create further uncertainty for business and complicate the
administration and delivery of  environmental regulation.
A further issue relates to the impact of  Brexit on the border between Northern Ireland
and the Republic of  Ireland. Identified by the EU as one of  the crucial issues to be
addressed in the Brexit negotiations, the difficulties and opportunities associated with how
changes to the nature of  the border will affect environmental governance are a prime
example of  the type of  complex questions that will need to be addressed by Northern Irish
politicians in conjunction with the Irish and British governments and the EU as the Brexit
process evolves. The transboundary nature of  many environmental problems, coupled
with the inherent need to cooperate with neighbouring jurisdictions to ensure
environmental protection is explicitly reflected in the provision for cross-border
environmental governance enshrined in the Good Friday Agreement.162 For example,
Strand Two acknowledges the crucial importance of  cross-border governance
relationships and establishes formal cooperation across a number of  areas, including the
environment.163 This reflects a clear recognition that close cooperation between
neighbouring jurisdictions can create ‘significant synergies and deliver beneficial
environmental outcomes more cost-effectively’.164 While there are strong arguments for
enhancing cross-border environmental governance given the significant and very similar
problems faced on either side of  the border and the cross-border nature of  issues like
waste crime and river basin management, this has become problematised by the Brexit
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 68(2)
157  Peter Walker, ‘Andrea Leadsom Promises Brexit Bonfire of  Regulation for Farmers’ The Guardian (London, 4
January 2017) <www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/04/andrea-leadsom-vows-to-scrap-eu-red-tape-for-
farmers-after-brexit>.
158  Philip Oltermann, ‘Hammond Threatens EU with Aggressive Tax Changes after Brexit’ The Guardian
(London, 15 January 2017) <www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/15/philip-hammond-suggests-uk-
outside-single-market-could-become-tax-haven>.
159  Daniel Boffey, ‘MEPs in Bid to Force UK to Meet Environmental Regulations after Brexit’ The Guardian
(London, 31 January 2017) <www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/31/european-parliament-force-uk-
meet-environmental-regulations-after-brexit>.
160  Northern Ireland is currently responsible for paying any EU infraction fines imposed as a result of  non-
transposition or implementation of  EU directives, as discussed previously (n 65).
161  Reid (n 153).
162  Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement 1998, Strand 2 <www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf>.
163  Ibid.
164  Burke et al (n 9) 32.
146
process which also clearly places existing cross-border measures in jeopardy.165 If
Northern Ireland’s environmental law diverges from the Republic of  Ireland’s EU-based
legal frameworks in the future then transboundary environmental governance will become
more difficult as institutional architectures and standards become potentially more
diverse.166 For example, differences in the structures and approaches to enforcement
adopted either side of  the border have in the past created regulatory gaps which have
facilitated illegal cross-border environmental crime to germinate and flourish.167
Management of  river basins which transcend the border will also require enhanced
cooperation and careful consideration of  cross-border policy impacts. These issues have
the potential to be magnified, dependent on the nature of  Brexit and the political situation
in Northern Ireland, and there is clearly a need for further, detailed investigation into what
retention of  the status quo (i.e. a ‘soft’ border), imposition of  a customs/physical (‘hard’)
border, or removal of  the border altogether might mean for overall success or failures of
any future environmental governance arrangements or law reforms.
The prospect of  Brexit has also thrown the role that the EU has played in the context
of  environmental protection to date into sharp resolution. Although there is a risk of
viewing what is considered an imperfect EU environmental law framework (particularly
the compliance and enforcement regimes)168 with a sense of  ‘nostalgia’, in the Northern
Ireland context the EU has played an undeniably important role.169 Lee has identified
three key functions that the EU has fulfilled to date in the context of  the UK
environment as ‘the big sticks of  Commission-plus-Court of  Justice enforcement
mechanisms and fines, but also a more subtle architecture of  transparency and political
accountability, as well as a series of  EU legal principles that render judicial review before
domestic courts more effective’.170 In the Northern Ireland context, possibly the most
obvious role of  the EU in the context of  environmental law has been its enforcement
function. Despite the slow pace of  EU enforcement procedures, they can (and have)
resulted in the imposition of  significant infraction fines171 and the threat of  these has
proven crucial in forcing the Northern Irish government to introduce and attempt to
maintain environmental standards.172 Importantly, the European Commission can
instigate infraction proceedings for not only failure to transpose directives, but in
situations where they have not been implemented correctly or applied properly in
practice. Jack highlights the case of  Commission v Ireland173 as demonstrative of  how the
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Court of  Justice of  the EU (CJEU) has applied the concept of  a ‘general and persistent
breach’ in ‘bad application’ cases.174 In this case, Ireland was found to have failed to fulfil
its Waste Framework Directive obligations by allowing illegal waste disposal sites to
continue operations. Importantly, the CJEU found that, in order to avoid financial
penalties, the general and persistent failure to enforce EU law would mean that Ireland
must not only address the operation of  the sites themselves, but the underlying systemic
failures that had facilitated their existence.175 In Northern Ireland there are clearly similar
issues and the spectre of  infraction fines has historically forced the devolved government
to try and deal more effectively with, for example, serious cross-border waste crime.176 If
this threat was removed, serious questions would emerge as to where the impetus for the
devolved government to maintain and enhance environmental protection efforts would
stem from.
6 Pathways to effective environmental governance
With these considerations in mind, reforms must now take place across the three areas
identified at the outset of  this analysis, i.e. environmental governance structures,
environmental law and policy, and regulatory practice. Firstly, the NIEA should be located
outside a central government department and be given the status of  a non-departmental
public body. Although not a panacea for the myriad problems that have characterised the
experience of  regulating the environment in Northern Ireland, the establishment of  an
IEPA would at least inject some much needed credibility into regulatory efforts in the wake
of  years of  scathing criticism. A particular advantage of  removing the regulatory function
from central government would be to alleviate concerns surrounding the potential for
political interference in regulatory decision-making and enhance public trust in
environmental regulation.177 While not removing the risk of  agency capture, locating the
regulator at arms-length distance of  a central government department would mitigate the
degree of  influence that industry (particularly the agricultural industry under the current
arrangements) and politicians currently have the opportunity to exert.178 The core
rationale for this important structural change is well documented, but, given the political
uncertainty that surrounds both the UK’s impending exit from the EU and the collapse of
the devolved administration, there is an urgent need to ensure environmental protection
can continue despite the surrounding political turmoil. Not only would making this change
insulate environmental protection from other political imperatives, but it would bring the
governance arrangements in this jurisdiction into line with those operating both in other
parts of  the UK and the Republic of  Ireland. Whilst the initial costs of  creating and
resourcing an independent agency might have short-term financial consequences and
provoke opposition within the Executive, there should be significant benefits to both the
environment and economy in the long term. The ability to engage more strategically and
systematically might also lead to stronger and more consistent and transparent
enforcement and it would allow for the streamlining and integration of  functions. A higher
degree of  independence should also allow greater flexibility in making the necessary
changes to speed up decisions and actions. An IEPA might also provide more visibility to
environmental guardianship, becoming an identifiable champion for the protection and
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improvement of  the Northern Ireland environment, as opposed to just another limb of  a
government department with multiple (and sometimes conflicting) portfolios.
A further structural innovation should be reform of  the oversight bodies designed to
hold the government to account in environmental matters. Within government, the
Stormont Committee for Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs has replaced two
previous committees, one of  which dealt solely with the environment.179 Given the
potential conflicts between the regulation and support of  the agricultural community in
the wake of  this merger, the performance of  DAERA should be subject to ongoing
review and one possible solution would be to establish an environmental (and sustainable
development) audit committee in the Northern Ireland Assembly. In England, there is a
House of  Commons Environmental Audit Select Committee in addition to a separate
Commons Select Committee on the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.180 The
Environmental Audit Committee’s role is to consider to what extent the policies and
programmes of  government departments and non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs)
contribute to environmental protection and sustainable development and to audit their
performance against government targets (and to report the findings to the House of
Commons).181 Having such a Committee in Northern Ireland should result in better
environmental integration and ensure that departments are carrying out their functions
within environmental limits. In addition, the environmental investigation capacity of
other scrutiny bodies outside of  government could be enhanced. The NIAO and the CJI
in particular have to date provided valuable insights into the scale of  the problems
surrounding environmental governance in Northern Ireland.182 Both bodies could
establish small dedicated internal teams to focus on environmental concerns and increase
scrutiny of  the performance of  key environmental governance structures such as the
NIEA or an independent regulator.
Secondly, measures should also be taken to ensure that there is a more integrated and
strategic plan to protect Northern Ireland’s environment. There should be an overarching
strategy on the protection of  the environment in one single document, which contains
strategic priorities of  the Executive and outcomes to be aimed at, and be written in a style
that is easily understandable. There should also be a review of  institutional arrangements
encompassing an examination of  who does what and why, where integration between
sectors and other departments applies and where it needs to be strengthened. In the
absence of  an independent environmental regulator, a Commissioner for the
Environment could be established to ensure effective implementation and application of
environmental law. Commissioners for human rights, police, children and older people
have all been established in Northern Ireland and these offices have in general achieved
a high level of  success. An Environment Commissioner could be appointed to oversee
the implementation and correct application of  all EU environmental laws and to oversee
sustainable development in Northern Ireland.183 While significant streamlining of
environmental regulation should be achieved as the integrated permitting regime
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introduced in 2016 finally comes into force, some further legislative change may also be
required, for example, the introduction of  more flexible environmental sanctions for
responding to breaches of  environmental law.184 In addition, an expert independent
special advisor should also be appointed by the Minister of  DAERA in support of
overseeing the implementation and correct application of  all EU environmental laws.
In terms of  further improvements to strategic planning, a core recommendation of  a
review undertaken by the Northern Ireland Land Matters Task Force in 2015 is the
development and implementation of  a Land Strategy for Northern Ireland.185 The vision
of  the Land Strategy is for land and landscapes being managed for the benefit of  people’s
well-being and prosperity, respecting the views of  communities, groups and individuals,
striving for environmental excellence, and making best use of  the environment’s multi-
functionality.186 Before this, there had been very little recognition of  the environment as
an asset to the Northern Ireland people generally. The proposed strategy would aim to
transcend sectoral policies and provide a framework to manage conflicting policy
priorities and balance competing demands on land. A Land Strategy coupled with the
Regional Development Strategy 2035 should deliver more strategic and consistent
decision-making in local councils as they develop their new land-use planning powers and
responsibilities gained in 2015. In addition to enhanced scrutiny of  environmental
decision-making, it might also be beneficial to have an entity in place that ensures
effective communication, working relationships and cooperation between central
government, local councils and waste management groups and which provides an
oversight role to guarantee a strategic approach to land-use planning. Updated, enhanced
and more easily accessible overarching strategies relating to environmental protection and
sustainable development could also help alleviate the fragmentation of  the current policy
landscape.187
Thirdly, a number of  significant improvements must also be made to the delivery of
enforcement in practice. As suggested by Burke, Bell and Turner’s review of
environmental governance in 2006,188 advocated by the CJI in 2007,189 promised by the
then Minister for the Environment in 2008190 and again reiterated by the CJI in 2011,191
the enforcement function of  the NIEA should be delivered by one integrated entity
within the NIEA. Given the strategic partnerships developed by the ECU with other
enforcement agencies, such as the Police Service of  Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the
PPS, and the need for a professionalised approach to intelligence and concentration of
skills pertaining to criminal and financial investigation, this integrated enforcement body
should be structured around the existing ECU, creating a unified, consistent and
proportionate enforcement response across all areas in which the NIEA has an
enforcement responsibility. Enforcement staff  from other units should be transferred to
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this unit in a staggered way over time. This would allow the agency to utilise existing
expertise in relation to the various areas of  responsibility, but standardise the
enforcement response on a pan-agency basis. It would also go some way towards breaking
down the entrenched structures within the DOE that have contributed to the inertia that
has characterised attempts to reform regulatory structures and practice. As a result, the
deterrent effect of  the enforcement action carried out by the NIEA would be significantly
strengthened. It would also serve the function of  creating a degree of  separation between
the enforcement arm of  the agency and the regulatory/compliance-based activities. In
addition, being ‘referred to the environmental crime unit’ could act as a deterrent in itself
to the regulated community. One risk of  this would be that certain types of
environmental offending could become marginalised if  they were not classed as being one
of  the strategic priorities of  the unit. However, steps could be taken to mitigate this risk
through a priority-setting process and it is unlikely that the net effect of  revised
arrangements would have a negative impact on areas where little enforcement action is
currently occurring. Recruitment of  investigative staff  with a core enforcement remit
rather than scientific officers would reflect the dual role that the NIEA must play and
better links with other agencies such as the PSNI, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
(HMRC), the National Crime Agency (NCA) and law enforcement bodies operating
across the border would also be beneficial.192
In addition, the NIEA, whether within or independent of  DAERA, should embed
specialist environmental lawyers into its governance structures. The benefits of
employing an in-house legal team are many, but fundamentally the expertise in
preparation of  case files would be enhanced, alternative and novel charges could be
considered and legally trained NIEA staff  could act as conduits between the enforcement
team and other law enforcement bodies such as the PPS and the NCA where relationships
need to be improved across the whole spectrum of  environmental offences. In parallel,
specialist environmental law prosecutors could be developed within the PPS. The same
problems that Northern Ireland is experiencing also frustrated the Scottish
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) in Scotland for over a decade, but were
eventually recognised by the Advocate General who was persuaded in 2011 to appoint
lawyers in the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) that specialised in
environmental law.193 There are now three specialists in wildlife and environmental crime
spread across Scotland that work together to share knowledge and experience of  cases.
In Scotland, the COPFS and SEPA have introduced an agreed protocol on concluding
investigations and prosecutions to ensure effective liaison and such a protocol could
lessen the gap between enforcement and prosecution that exists in Northern Ireland.194
The NIEA should develop a more calibrated and representative enforcement policy
and published information relating to the enforcement policy adopted by the agency
needs to be enhanced. One approach that could be taken is to follow the example of  the
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English Environment Agency (EA) which has published information relating to its
enforcement policy in three parts.195 Firstly, it has a short enforcement statement that
gives an overarching, high-level summary of  the principles of  enforcement used by the
agency in terms of  deciding when and what form of  enforcement action to take.196 This
statement is backed up by an enforcement and sanctions guidance document, providing
information on the various types of  enforcement response available to the agency and
details on how it calculates and applies these sanctions and the various associated
processes.197 Finally, a document detailing the enforcement response options and
information on how these will be applied for every offence that falls under the remit of
the EA underpins the enforcement statement and guidance.198 In Scotland, SEPA also
publishes an overarching summary of  its enforcement policy and this is backed up by
detailed ‘supporting guidance’ documents relating to specific issues that fall under SEPA’s
remit and which include a section on enforcement.199
In terms of  the criminal justice system and environmental prosecutions, one
possibility would be to produce updated and more extensive sentencing guidelines.
Northern Ireland currently has sentencing guidelines for some environmental crimes.200
However, these guidelines only cover five separate offences in the magistrates’ courts and
provide significantly less detail than the equivalent guidance produced for England.201 In
2014, new sentencing guidelines202 which apply to the sentencing of  various
environmental offences in the English magistrates’ and Crown courts were published in
England by the Sentencing Council. The aim of  these new guidelines is to ensure fines
have a real economic impact and provide a stronger deterrent to re-offending. The
English courts must now consider: making a compensation order for injury or loss or
damage resulting from the offence; confiscation; the offence category (culpability and
harm); and the tables showing the category ranges when setting a fine.203 The range of
fines has been vastly increased to reflect an offender’s ability to pay. The court will review
the sentence as a whole to ensure that any economic benefit that was derived from the
offence (for example, avoided costs) has been removed and it is proportionate to the
means of  the offender to ensure significant economic impact.204
Finally, although there is a clear need to improve the delivery of  enforcement of
environmental law in Northern Ireland, there are other mechanisms that could help
improve compliance levels and reduce the need for enforcement activity. In a general
sense, cooperation with the regulated community and better (and earlier) provision of
education and advice would assist businesses in achieving compliance and avoiding
enforcement action. The establishment of  a centralised enforcement body within the
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NIEA would provide a degree of  separation between the enforcement and
advice/persuasion elements of  the agency to avoid the compromise of  any enforcement
and deterrent efforts. Alternatively, a separate body to the NIEA could fulfil the
education and advice function to ensure a more straightforward separation of  these
often-conflicting roles. The optimal scenario would be for an IEPA to fulfil the
enforcement function, while provision of  education, advice and support continued to be
delivered by DAERA. In terms of  agricultural pollution, while the MOU between
DAERA and the UFU has been criticised for its potential to lead to light-touch
regulation, weak enforcement and the risk of  agency-capture, it might also help foster
better links with the agricultural community and facilitate better provision of  education
and advice.205 The controversial aspect of  the MOU relates to low severity agricultural
pollution incidents and the NIEA’s response to this category of  pollution.206 Under the
EU cross-compliance rules relating to subsidy payments to farmers, any pollution will
automatically result in an inspection and that can then result in a penalty being applied to
a farm’s subsidy payment.207 The NIEA is seeking permission from the EU to allow
farmers who cause low-level pollution to avoid the inspection and receive a fixed penalty
notice or mandatory training course instead. While prima facie this seems like a
reasonable suggestion and would certainly ease tensions between the NIEA and the
agricultural community, the rationale behind the EU rules is significant and particularly so
in Northern Ireland. While low-level agricultural pollution incidents are minor on an
individual level, the cumulative impact of  multiple low-level pollution incidents results in
serious diffuse pollution.208 The farm subsidies provided to farmers are incentives not to
pollute and thus remain the obvious route through which to penalise pollution incidents,
regardless of  how minor. Removing this aspect of  the MOU would make it much less
controversial and ensure that robust regulation of  agricultural pollution can occur.
In relation to the waste industry, the Mills Report published in 2014 has recognised
widespread non-compliance with waste regulation and, clearly, raising compliance levels
in this sector would decrease the problem of  illegal dumping.209 Better liaison,
cooperation and information-sharing between the NIEA and local authorities would
close enforcement gaps and the agreement of  a clear and robust fly-tipping protocol for
the entire jurisdiction should be established. The duty of  care owed by public authorities
in disposal of  municipal waste should also be enforced more stringently to ensure
reputable companies are being given the business of  handling, for example, recycling
waste. Enhancement and more robust enforcement of  producer responsibility, legislation
and recalibration or reconsideration of  landfill tax may also be required.210 Modernisation
of  waste regulation systems could also occur and emerging technologies offer new
avenues for ensuring compliance. For example, a mandatory electronic duty of  a care-
based system to replace the current paper-based waste transfer notes could be imposed
on operators. Electronic duty of  care (eDoc) systems for waste have already been
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successfully developed in England, where they have been free to use and trials saved the
companies using them time, effort and money in fulfilling their duty of  care requirements
for the waste.211 Compliance with mineral extraction regulation could be enhanced via a
duty on the owner of  the land to put up adequate security fencing around disused quarries
to stop them being illegally quarried, or to place them under a duty to do regular checks
to ensure unlicensed operations are not taking place. More clarity surrounding planning
policy guidance, licensing and time limits on quarrying activities could also help alleviate
the current problems with illegal mineral extraction.
7 Conclusion
A model of  environmental governance that is robust, promotes compliance with rules and
also has greater business support will generate significant benefits (and opportunities) for
Northern Ireland’s economy as well as protecting its environment. In the short term, the
NIAO should be asked to conduct a review examining the economic impacts of
environmental regulation and value for money of  public expenditure on the environment
in order to clearly demonstrate this link. To further demonstrate this, the PAC might also
be asked to produce a report on the long-term opportunities of  looking at the economy
and the environment in a more joined-up way. By making the links between environmental
governance failure and potential economic crisis on one hand and good environmental
governance and sustainable economic development on the other, such reports might gain
more political traction than they have in the past. With the DUP/Conservative deal
creating an intense lack of  trust between all major political parties and recent elections
demonstrating an apparent reinvigoration of  tribal politics, there is growing need and
increased demands for evidence-based policy-making in Northern Ireland.212 Robust
research which provides unequivocal justification for important environmental governance
reforms will be increasingly difficult for politicians to ignore, especially as the actual cost
of  regulatory and policy failures begins to become clear.
In the short to medium term there is a need to enhance public trust in government’s
environmental protection efforts. One method through which this could be achieved is
through the externalisation of  the NIEA to a non-departmental public body. Other
changes will require more clarity about the role of  the environmental regulator, both
internally and externally. A consistent message to the public and regulated community
about the rules and regulations that the NIEA is tasked with upholding is necessary and
this will not happen whilst internal enforcement arrangements are fragmented. Recent
efforts within the NIEA have been made to address this issue. However, civil servants are
curtailed in the degree to which major decisions are made in the absence of  a devolved
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government.213 There have clearly been a lot of  recommendations given by many different
individuals and bodies over the years as to how environmental governance and regulation
might be better managed or reformed, but these have not led to many substantive or
effective changes in practice. Adopting a new non-departmental public body would be a
positive step, but there will be a significantly greater chance of  improvements if  there is
the political will to implement some of  the additional governance and regulatory changes
(which do not attract as many political headlines), as suggested by experts like Macrory,
Bell, Burke, Turner, NGOs and government bodies such as the CJI. As discussed
previously in this analysis, these changes must take place across governance structures, law
and policy and the delivery of  environmental regulation.
Longer-term reforms will depend inherently on Brexit and the shape of  the UK’s exit
deal. Should the UK leave the Single Market and ignite a ‘bonfire of  regulations’, there is
a risk that environmental law will be diluted and environmental standards will fall. The
effect could be more profound in Northern Ireland where, given the precarious state of
the environment, any reduction in environmental regulation could have potentially
catastrophic impacts. For example, intensification of  agriculture coupled with lax
regulation of  agricultural pollution could lead to increased degradation of  the already at
risk aquatic environment – with knock-on effects that include increased water purification
costs, eutrophication and damage to protected species and habitats. Whether EU counter-
measures are employed to mitigate this risk or whether the UK as a whole instigates
measures to prevent fragmentation and divergence in environmental standards across its
constituent parts remains to be seen. Significant uncertainty also surrounds the question
of  whether environmental funding provided to Northern Ireland under EU schemes such
as Horizon 2020, LIFE+ and INTERREG will be matched by the devolved or UK
governments after Brexit.214 Given the uniquely challenging regulatory context, turbulent
political context and the historical legacy of  environmental governance failures in
Northern Ireland, any reform agenda must be able to adapt to ongoing political
developments, be based on robust evidence and be designed to deal with the issues faced
in this jurisdiction rather than merely trying to ‘catch up’ with UK or EU standards of
protection. In this respect two key avenues may offer opportunities to a more ambitious
and long-term programme of  environmental governance reform and the viability of
these should be explored by government.
Firstly, there is room for engagement in a more thoughtful process of  reform
regarding use of  new environmental policy tools. In Northern Ireland one rare
environmental policy success has been the use of  the plastic bag tax to reduce the number
of  plastic bags sent to landfill. The policy has resulted in substantial reductions in the
numbers of  plastic bags in circulation, as well as generating over £3 million for
environmental improvement projects n 2015/16 alone.215 However, there is a need for
further engagement with the use of  other new and emerging policy innovations, and
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critical ‘what works’ evaluation of  the success of  existing tools.216 For example, although
the landfill tax has clearly reduced the amount of  waste being disposed of  in landfill sites,
an unintended consequence has been the creation of  a very significant illegal dumping
problem across Northern Ireland and its border with the Republic of  Ireland.217 In
addition, research has demonstrated significant problems with the use of  criminal
sanctions as a response to breaches of  environmental law in Northern Ireland.218 A
growing body of  literature has examined questions relating to new environmental policy
instruments across Europe and valuable lessons may be gained from policy-maker
engagement with a broader range of  tools and detailed context-specific analysis of  the
tools currently employed to deliver environmental outcomes in this jurisdiction.219
Secondly, enhanced cross-border cooperation to deal with the environmental challenges
faced on the island of  Ireland could present opportunities to ensure maintenance of  EU
standards of  environmental protection post-Brexit, reduction of  unnecessary duplication
of  regulatory services, streamlining of  administrative processes associated with any
alteration to the border and prevention of  divergent regimes on either side of  the border
from creating opportunities for environmental crime. There is a constitutional basis for
cross-border cooperation on environmental matters enshrined in the Good Friday
Agreement. There is also political precedent for the provision of  all-island services when
there is a clear and pragmatic case for doing so, for example, in the provision of  children’s
clinical services via the all-island Congenital Heart Disease Network and the associated
Cross-Jurisdictional Oversight Group.220 In addition, there are already important aspects
of  the environment which are being successfully managed on an all-island basis, for
example, close cooperation on river basin management221 and in relation to responding
to invasive species.222 The strong environmental, legal and political drivers for an all-
island approach to environmental governance have also been highlighted by the
comprehensive Review of  Environmental Governance in Northern Ireland undertaken in
2007.223 Applying this approach to environmental governance could present a significant
opportunity to re-evaluate the highly criticised approaches that have been adopted on
both sides of  the border and develop a jointly delivered system that more effectively
protects the environment on an all-island basis.
Given the political crisis currently enveloping Northern Ireland’s devolved
administration and, at the time of  writing, little chance of  the re-establishment of  the
Stormont assembly in the short term, it is easy to relegate environmental governance
issues down the list of  urgent priorities. However, a well-managed environment should be
seen as a vital asset for the shared future of  the people of  Northern Ireland and a greater
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focus on protecting this common (not tribal) interest would enhance confidence in
power-sharing and demonstrate stability. The importance assigned to environmental
protection by the public in Northern Ireland is evident in the high membership numbers
of  environmental NGOs in Northern Ireland. This indicates that there is clearly an
appetite for environmental protection that is currently at odds with the level of
importance assigned to it by the previous devolved governments. Ultimately, Northern
Ireland’s politicians from across the political spectrum must realise the inextricable links
between environmental protection, economic development and social well-being and
reflect this realisation in government priorities if  and when a political settlement is
reached.224 In the meantime, there is a need for urgent action in order to avoid potentially
catastrophic environmental damage and limit the spiralling economic consequences of
decades of  environmental governance failure.
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